A. DEFINITIONS AND AIMS
In the matter of deciding where ethics, "one of the subtlest of studies" ( Peirce followed the tradition of his day in placing it with logic and aesthetics among the normative sciences (L.i9i).
"A normative science is one which studies what ought to be" (I.28i), and a science which thus is concerned with "the theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum bonum" (I.573), is "the very most purely theoretical of purely theoretical sciences" (I.28I), in that it sets up "norms, or rules which need not, but which ought, to be followed" (IJ.I56). Ethics, Peirce defined as "the science of right and wrong, .... the theory of selfcontrolled, or deliberate conduct" (I.I9I). It is "the study of what ends of action we are deliberately prepared to adopt" (V.I30). "Ethics-the genuine normative science of ethics, as contradistinguished from the branch of anthropology which in our day often passes under the name of ethics-this genuine ethics is the normative science par excellence, because an end-the essential object of normative science-is germane to a voluntary act in a primary way in which it is germane to nothing else" (V.I30).
By judging ethics to be the theoretical science of ideals, Peirce has admitted that it is "the philosophy of aims" and has succumbed to the same temptation that beset Socrates, namely, to suppose that ethics is a branch of logic (IV.240).
But this is not to vary with its normative character, for every science which is founded in logic must be an exact science. Peirce admitted no conflict between normative and exact science. A normative science, in his view, is one which must answer all the empirical requirements of an 98 exact science and yet be oriented in the pursuit of an ideal as well. He said of logic, another "normative science," that "it thus has a-strongly mathematical character." But to say that a science has a mathematical branch is only to say that it is a science. For "so much may be said of every science." This, of course, does not mean that the ideal will be found tomorrow or that it can be worked out mechanically. "Pure ethics has been, and always must be, a theatre of discussion, for the reason that its study consists in the gradual development of a distinct recognition of a satisfactory aim"
But what is the ultimate aim of ethical conduct? A great many alternatives have been suggested by various ethical theorists. Peirce considered that he had described most of them under the following headings. A man may act for the sake of momentary satisfactions (1.582), the prompt satisfaction of instincts (1.583), provision for the satisfaction of future instincts (1.584), pleasure (I.603-5), "from persuasion, or from imitative instinct, or from dread of blame, or in awed obedience to an instant command; or he may act according to some general rule restricted to his own wishes, such as the pursuit of pleasure, or self-preservation, or good-will toward an acquaintance, or attachment to home and surroundings, or conformity to the customs of his tribe, or reverence for a law; or, becoming a moralist, he may aim at bringing about an ideal state of things definitely conceived, such as one in which everybody attends exclusively to his own business and interest (individualism), or in which the maximum total pleasure of all beings capable of pleasure is attained (utilitarianism), or in which altruistic sentiments universally prevail (altruism), or in which his community is placed out of all danger (patriotism), or in which the ways of nature are as little modified as possible (naturalism); or he may aim at hastening some result not otherwise known in advance than as that, whatever it may turn out to be, to which some process seeming to him good must inevitably lead, such as whatever the dictates of the human heart approve (sentimentalism), or whatever would result from every man's duly weighing, before action, the advantages of his every purpose (to which I will attach the noncename, entelism), or whatever the historical evolution of public sentiment may decree (historicism), or whatever the operation 6f cosmical causes may be destined to bring about (evolutionism); or he may be devoted to truth, and may be determined to do nothing not pronounced reasonable, either by his own cogitations (rationalism), or by public discussion (dialecticism), or by crucial experiment; or he may feel that the only thing really worth striving for is the generalizing or assimilating elements in truth, and that either as the sole object in which the mind can ultimately recognize its veritable aim (educationalism), or that which alone is destined to gain universal sway (pancratism); or, finally, he may be filled with the idea that the only reason that can reasonably be admitted as ultimate is that living reason for the sake of which the psychical and physical universe is in process of creation religionismm) . Peirce concluded that they fell far short of constituting the ultimate ethical aim. "All motives that are directed toward pleasure or self-satisfaction, of however high a type, will be pronounced by every experienced person to be inevitably destined to miss the satisfaction at which they aim.
"On the other hand, every motive involving dependence on some other leads us to ask for some ulterior reason. The only desirable object which is quite satisfactory in itself without any ulterior reason for desiring it, is the reasonable itself."5 This, Peirce maintained, "is an experiential truth. The only ethically sound motive is the most general one." "The ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or continuous" (V.4).
A good aim is one which can be pursued (V.I33). But an aim which can be achieved in a finite time and space is one which cannot be indefinitely pursued and is hence a bad aim, for "an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all. The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim." Hence, according to Peirce, only he who has an infinite aim can be said to be acting in accordance with moral good. The final aim for Peirce is the summum bonum, and this direction is by no means confined to human beings, since it is that toward which being itself is aimed (J.i i6-i8). Finally, however, ethics "must appeal to esthetics for aid in de-S termining the summum bonum" (i.19i), since the ideal of ethics must be drawn from "the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason." Thus ethics, pure ethics, if it is to have any utility in the sense of producing something that can be applied to practice as a norm of conduct, must be approached as though it were "as useless a science as can be conceived" (I.667). "A useless inquiry, provided it is a systematic one, is pretty much the same thing as a scientific inquiry. Or at any rate if a scientific inquiry becomes by any mischance useful, that aspect of it has to be kept sedulously out of sight during the investigation or else .... its hopes of success are fatally cursed" (I.668).
B. PROBLEMS AND METHODS

Ethics is divided by
Although the central problem of pure ethics, which is "to ascertain what end is possible" (V.I34), should become an exact study, it must not be "thoughtlessly supposed that special science could aid in this ascertainment." There is nothing worse, either for the special sciences or as a guide to the latter (I.55). An absolute aim cannot be affected by the findings with regard to contingent facts, for an absolute aim is that "which would be pursued under all possible circumstances." In pragmatism the translation of a proposition into action involves an endless future as well as the present.6 But the future more than the present can be influenced by self-control. Hence pure ethics which is concerned with possible conduct rather than with practical action has its emphasis on the future (V.427).
"The pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were .... said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable" (IV.547). "In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control" (V.433). Pragmatism thus involves pure ethics in evolution and takes it out of the sphere both of the immediately practical and of the discretely factual.
It must not be supposed that because Peirce separated pure from practical ethics that he was also opposed to a connection between them. "The point of view of utility is always a narrow point of view" (I.64I). On the other hand, a pure study which did not issue in practical utility would be a waste indeed. It so happened that Peirce believed in "the eternal life of the idea [of] Right" (I.2 I9), but, on the other hand, he felt that this "despised idea has all along been the one irresistible power" (I.25 i)-a power that concerns the practical sciences, such as law, politics, and economics. That justice, for example, is "a very great power in the world is no figure of speech, but a plain fact to which theories must accommodate themselves" (I.348). The exclusion of the findings of pure ethics from such practical pursuits has been an "immense folly." We do not escape the consequences of ignoring pure ethics in everyday conduct, for, "notwithstanding the horrible wickedness of every mortal wight, the idea of right and wrong is nevertheless the greatest power on this earth, to which every knee must sooner or later bow or be broken down" (I.2I7).
The danger of confusing theory and practice in ethics is one which threatens not only them but their interrelations. "The effect of mixing speculative inquiry with questions of conduct results finally in a sort of half make-believe reasoning which deceives itself in regard to its real character" (I.56). "Men continue to tell themselves they regulate their conduct by reason; but they learn to look forward and see what conclusions a given method will lead to before they give their adhesion to it. In short, it is no longer the reasoning which determines what the conclusion shall be, but it is the conclusion which determines what the reasoning shall be. This is sham reasoning. In short, as morality supposes self-control, men learn that they must not surrender themselves unreservedly to any method, without considering to what conclusions it will lead them. But this is utterly contrary to the single-mindedness that is requisite in science. In order that science may be successful, its votaries must hasten to surrender themselves at discretion to experimental inquiry, in advance of knowing what its decisions may be. There must ,be no reservations" (I.57).
"It is notoriously true that into whatever you do not put your whole heart and soul in that you will not have much success. Now, the two masters, and 
C. THE MEANING OF PRACTICE
The solution of these problems in ethics will have to appeal to a principle already established by Peirce in the course of his methodological investigations. We should expect that pragmatism, as the relation of meaning to practicality, would have an important bearing upon ethical problems, and so it has. In this section we shall examine the bearing of this relationship from the point of view of meaning. The bearing from the point of view of practice will be treated in the next section.
One, at least, of the functions of intelligence is "to adapt conduct to circumstances, so as to subserve desire" (V.548). "Thereupon it follows that the concept has a capability of having a bearing upon conduct; and this fact will lend it intellectual purport." "Right and wrong are expressly volitional" (I.330), but that volition has an external object toward which it is directed. Since the very "existence of things consists in their regular behavior" (I.41I), we may well ask whether volition is not to be judged on the basis of that behavior toward which it leads. The ethical criteria of good and bad are predicates of objects. They are not subjective feelings; or, rather, like all subjective feelings, they refer to objects cessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception (V.9). The moral goodness of a proposition consists in all the good consequences which might conceivably follow from its application. But since this pragmatic conception is couched in terms of conceivable consequences, it reaches "far beyond the practical." "Those whose sentiments I share abhor certain doctrines of certain writers upon Ethics7 -say, for example, those who make action the ultimate end of man" (II.15).
Hence the ethical version of the doctrine of pragmatism belongs in the province of pure ethics. In other words, if pragmatism is applicable to all conduct, that is, to conduct understood in the widest sense (VI.48i), then it must be applicable to the narrower range of moral conduct as well. From the point of view of pure ethics, pragmatism allows conduct to become an experimental test for hypotheses concerning conduct; the emphasis is placed not on conduct but on propositions. This is not to say that men must act out their lives in order to prove or disprove ethical hypotheses; from the point of view of practical ethics, the moral conduct is more important than the propositions from which it follows. But in the study of pure ethics conduct plays the role of experimentation, and its allowance or rejection of ethical hypotheses is carefully noted.
Peirce has said that according to pragmatism "purport consists in a conditional proposition concerning conduct, [and that] a sufficiently deliberate consideration of that purport will reflect that the conditional conduct ought to be regulated by an ethical principle" (V.535). If it is true that "any kind of goodness consists in the adaptation of its subject to its end" (V.I58), and satisfaction consists in having an action congruous to its end (V.56o), then abduction, which is the logic of pragmatism (V.I95), is "the only possible hope of regulating future conduct rationally" (II.270). Therefore, the theories that one ought to entertain are only those which are conducive to a certain end. "That ought to be done which is conducive to a certain end. The inquiry therefore should begin with searching for the end of thinking. What do we think for?" (V.594). This is a question which will have to take us into certain psychological inquiries, and other matters concerning practical ethics, but which will hardly end there. The conclusion will demand a program of moral conduct and therefore belong in practical ethics, but it will reveal that this demand issues from an ethical principle which was implicit in pure ethics all the while.
II. PRACTICAL ETHICS
A. THE TRANSITION TO MORALITY
In this and the following sections we shall see how a study of practical action leads inevitably to the principle of pure ethics. If pure ethics is meaningless without some application, application itself requires something to be applied. Peirce named practical ethics "antethics" or "practics" and described it as "the conformity of action to an ideal" (I.573). "Ethics is not practics; first, because ethics involves more than the theory of such conformity; namely, it involves the theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum bonum; and secondly, because in so far as ethics studies the conformity of conduct to an ideal, it is limited to a particular ideal, which .... is in fact nothing but a sort of composite photograph of the conscience of the members of the community." The discussion of morality in the abstract, however, despite the personal limitations of individuals, is likely to lead toward some sort of solution and settlement of the moral problem. "In regard to morals we can see ground for hope that debate will ultimately cause one party or other to modify their sentiments up to complete accord" (II.I50. Casuistry, or "the determination of what under given circumstances ought to or maybe done" (I.557) can be an aid in this regard. The reason for this is that the basis of morality is objective and constitutes a constant upon the discovery of which men must find agreement. "It is true that the majority of writers on ethics in the past have made the root of morals subjective; but the best opinion is very plainly moving in the opposite direction" (II.I56). "Lofty moral sense consists in 8 regarding, not indeed the, but yet an, ideal world as in'some sense the only real one; and hence it is that stern moralists are always inclined to dual distinctions" (III.529). "Morality insists that a motive is either good or bad. That the gulf between them is bridged over and that most motives are somewhere near the middle of the bridge, is quite contrary to the teachings of any moral system which ever lived in the hearts and consciences of a people" (I.6i). "The very simplest and most rudimentary of all conceivable systems of quantity is that one which distinguishes only two values. This is the system of evaluation which ethics applies to actions in dividing them into the right and the wrong" (IV.368). Morality, as the application of ethical principles to conduct, must be an affair of approaching more or less closely to but not of attaining absolute limits. Thus it requires a many-valued system and not merely a two-valued one. "The rule of ethics will be to adhere to the only possible absolute aim, and to hope that it will prove attainable. Meantime, it is comforting to know that all experience is favorable to that assumption" (V.I36). With this understanding, we may now turn to an analysis of the mechanism whereby the purpose of ethics is pursued in morality.
B. THE PRACTICE OF MEANING
The practice of meaning, so far as human action is concerned, may be summed up in the one word "conduct," and conduct may be described as the "phenomena of controlled action" (I.6oi). "Selfcontrol of any kind is purely inhibitory. Each of these self-criticisms is accompanied by a judgment, which, if favorable, is felt as pleasurable. Such self-criticism is "the only respectable kind, which will bear fruit in the future. Whether the man is satisfied with himself or dissatisfied, his nature will absorb the lesson like a sponge; and the next time he will tend to do better than he did before." "In addition to these three self-criticisms of single series of actions, a man will from time to time review his ideals. This process is not a job that a man sits down to do and has done with. The experience of life is continually contributing instances more or less illuminative. These are digested first, not in the man's consciousness, but in the depths of his reasonable being. The results come to consciousness later. But meditation seems to agitate a mass of tendencies and allow them more quickly to settle down so as to be really more conformed to what is fit for the man" (I.599). It is true that "we base our conduct on facts already known, and for these we can only draw upon our memory" (V.460), but "future facts are the only facts that we can, in a measure, control" (V.46i). "It cannot be denied that acritical inferences may refer to the past in its capacity as past; but according to Pragmatism, the conclusion of a reasoning power must refer to the future. For its meaning refers to conduct, and since it is a reasoned conclusion must refer to deliberate conduct, which is controllable conduct. But the only controllable conduct is future conduct" (V.461). Hence ethical reasoning is for the sake of future conduct. "Conduct controlled by ethical reasoning tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct" (V.430).
There are certain implications from this description of the analysis of conduct to problems of belief and of self-control, and in one place or another Peirce has himself drawn them. As to belief, it is "the principle upon which we are willing to act" (I.636). Resolutions are made and judgments determined to a very large extent by the ethos. "Conscience really belongs to the subconscious man, to that part of the soul which is hardly distinct in different individuals, a sort of community-consciousness, or public spirit, not absolutely one and the same in different citizens, and yet not by any means independent in them. Conscience has been created by experience, just as by [which] gives room for an ought-to-be-of conduct" (IV. 540). "In the formation of habits of deliberate action, we may imagine the occurrence of the stimulus, and think out what the results of different actions will be. One of these will appear particularly satisfactory; and then an action of the soul takes place which is well described by saying that the mode of reaction 'receives a deliberate stamp of approval' "(V.538). Another name for this stamp of approval is expectancy, "the act of recognition as one's own, being placed by a deed of the soul upon an imaginary anticipation of experience" (V.540). The only difference between belief and this kind of expectancy is that "the former is expectant of muscular sensation, the latter of sensation not muscular." "It now begins to look strongly as if perhaps all belief might involve expectation as its essence" (V.542).
"Self-control seems to be the capacity for rising to an extended view of a practical subject instead of seeing only temporary urgency" (V.339, n. i). There are modes of self-control which are quite instinctive, others which result from training, still others which follow from the control of self-control, etc. (V.533). The only distinction between human beings and other animals is that in the case of human beings there is "a greater number of grades of self-control." For even thinking is a faculty which is "a phenomenon of self-control." (V.534). Self-control means that "a process of self-preparation will tend to impart to action (when the occasion for it shall arise) one fixed character, which is indicated and perhaps roughly measured by the absence (or slightness) of the feeling of self-reproach, which subsequent reflection will induce. Now, this subsequent reflection is part of the self-preparation for action on the next occasion. Consequently, there is a tendency, as action is repeated again and again, for the action to approximate indefinitely toward the perfection of that fixed character, which would be marked by entire absence of self-reproach" (V.4I8). Self-control "is the only freedom of which man has any reason to be proud" (V.339, n. i). The inference which follows from approval must be voluntary (V.I30). We can will nothing where there is no freedom. Peirce maintained that his account of conduct thus "leaves a man at full liberty, no matter if we grant all that the necessitarians ask. That is, the man can, or if you please is compelled, to make his life more reasonable" (I.602).
"We can perceive that good reasoning and good morals are closely allied" (I.576). Nevertheless, "in the conduct of life, we have to distinguish everyday affairs and great crises. In the great decisions," said Pierce, he did "not believe it is safe to trust to individual reasoning" (I.623). In practical matters reasoning can be exaggerated (I.626). We ought not hastily to change our conduct to fit a philosophy of ethics (I.633). It is instinct rather than reasoning which must serve as the dependable guide to crises. With dumb animals, instinct guides in little as well as in large affairs. But "while human instincts are not so detailed and featured as those of the dumb animals, yet they might be sufficient to
